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Federal and state governments often differ in the capacity to pre-commit to expenditure and 
tax policy. Whether the implied sequence of public decisions has any efficiency implications 
is the subject of this paper. We resort to a setting which contrary to most of the literature does 
not exhibit a perfect tax-base overlap. We show that a federal government's pre-commitment 
capacity is welfare-improving. Efficiency, however, does not improve over all decision 
margins. The welfare-increasing policy entails a more distorted level of public consumption. 
Moreover, welfare may also improve if local governments are able to pre-commit towards the 
upper level. The rationale is that although federal transfers are formally unconditional they 
nevertheless entail a tax-price effect; thereby potentially counteracting incentives to engage in 
a “race to the bottom” in fiscal competition among local governments. 
JEL Code: H71, H23, H10. 
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I am grateful to numerous conference and seminar participants for constructive comments. 1 Introduction
In most countries decentralized governments have the authority to decide on local taxes and
expenditures. Independently of the degree of ¯scal autonomy their policy choices are signi¯-
cantly in°uenced by the ¯scal relations with the federal government. Re°ecting e±ciency and
redistributive concerns the federal and local budgets are linked via a complex set of ¯scal ar-
rangements which include equalization payments, matching grants, and revenue-sharing systems.
The way in which the federal tax-transfer system in°uences local policy depends on the spe-
ci¯c formula used to allocate funds to local governments.1 However, the incentive e®ects of
the federal tax-transfer system are also related to the pre-commitment capacity by di®erent
levels of government. As shown recently, e±ciency in local ¯scal choices can be realized without
resorting to formulaic (Pigouvian) transfers. Depending on the governments' pre-commitment
capacity, lump-sum transfers may be su±cient to overcome ine±ciencies which are rooted either
in a tax-base overlap or in public consumption spill-overs.2 The unorthodox e±ciency results of
federal transfer policy have been derived in ¯scal settings with either a perfect tax base over-
lap (Boadway and Keen, 1996) or exclusive taxation by lower-level governments (Caplan et al.,
2000). The paper deviates from these contributions (and from most existing analyses of federal
policy making) by assuming that the federal and local taxing authority does not perfectly over-
lap as e.g. observed in Canada, Germany and the U.S. We assume a two-layer federal system
with source-based capital taxation at the lower governmental level and labor taxation at the
upper level of government. Since capital is mobile between local jurisdictions, the capital tax is
distortionary from the perspective of local governments (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986). The
1See Dahlby (1996) for an analysis of e±ciency enhancing formulaic grants (Pigouvian grants). Equalizing
transfers may become formulaic by conditioning them on a measure of local ¯scal capacity. Besides their redis-
tributive properties they are also capable of promoting e±ciency - see e.g. Koethenbuerger (2002).
2Boadway and Keen (1996) show that if the federal government is able to pre-commit, lump-sum transfers are
su±cient to correct ine±ciencies in local policy choices which relate to a tax base overlap. The e±ciency result
extends to environments with decentralized redistribution (Boadway et al., 1998) and heterogeneous regions if
federal policy instruments are su±ciently di®erentiated (Sato, 2000). Reversely, if local governments are able to
pre-commit, federal lump-sum transfers induce local governments to e±ciently contribute to a global public good
(Silva and Caplan, 1997 and Caplan et al., 2000).
2federal government decides on lump-sum transfers to local governments which, along with capi-
tal tax revenues, are spent on public consumption. The modeling choice mirrors the tax/transfer
assignment in a variety of federal states. The federal government makes unconditional trans-
fers to state governments, most notably to address a vertical imbalance of federal and state
tax revenues relative to their expenditure responsibilities or to undo horizontal imbalances in
local public funds. Although conditional grants to correct ine±cient incentives to compete for
mobile capital are well understood in theory, their practical relevance is limited.3 As to the
allocation of tax instruments, in most countries the federal level has the income tax and the
value-added tax. In a static setting both taxes primarily resort to labor income as we assume
in the paper.4 Local governments in contrast have access to a limited set of tax instruments.
For instance, in Germany the only ¯scally important local tax instrument is a source-based
capital tax (Gewerbesteuer) (levied by municipalities). Furthermore, it appears to be a common
feature of federations that states which are linked by a federal transfer system are engaged in
¯scal competition at the same time - e.g. Canada, Germany, USA.
We are interested in comparing the tax and expenditure choices when either the federal or
state governments are unable to pre-commit with the traditionally simultaneously determined
policy choices. Existing literature is open as to which pre-commitment capacity is more sugges-
tive in ¯scal federalism. Based on institutional analysis5, Hoyt and Jensen (1996) argue that
U.S. states are able to pre-commit toward local governments. The ability re°ects the consti-
tutionally anchored state government supremacy over local governments. In contrast, states
within the Russian federation are conjectured to be in a better position to pre-commit than the
3Indeed, the European Union addresses ine±ciencies inherent to tax competition by tax coordination agree-
ments (involving e.g. information exchange among national ¯scal authorities) rather than by implementing
Pigouvian grants.
4The common tax base also includes capital income which, as a source of tax revenue, is of minor importance
relative to labor income.
5Related econometric analysis is almost non-existent - the exception being Hayashi and Boadway (2001) who
report mixed evidence as to whether the federal government pre-commits towards provincial governments in
Canada.
3federal government (Keen, 1998). Furthermore, among Canadian provinces Ontario is argued to
have the capacity to pre-commit since 40% of federal tax revenues stem from Ontario (Dahlby,
1996). In the European Union (EU) it is controversially debated whether Brussels has the abil-
ity to pre-commit toward member states. The \weakness" may re°ect the bottom-up historical
evolution of European institutions which has left signi¯cant political power with member states
(Caplan et al., 2000).6
Also, federal governments are generically bound to equalize public funds across member
states so as to enable households access to a minimum public service level irrespective of the
place of residence in the federation (e.g. Boadway, 2004).7 The primacy often coerces federal
government to accommodate state governments' ¯nances ex-post; thereby undermining the fed-
eral pre-commitment ability.
The paper's main results are as follows: If the federal government pre-commits towards local
governments, e±ciency may not improve over all public decision margins. The federal govern-
ment optimally reduces transfers (and thus distortionary labor taxes) in order to strengthen
local incentives to resort to capital taxation. Thereby, it exposes public expenditure levels more
severely to the downward pressure exerted by ¯scal competition. Despite the fact that the
e±ciency e®ects of federal policy are countervailing, overall welfare increases.
If states can pre-commit, the welfare implications are ambiguous. The welfare di®erential
is non-monotonically related to the degree of capital mobility. With a high capital mobility,
6Two important political institutions in the EU are the European Commission (EC) and the European Council
of Ministers (consisting of member states' ministers widely representing national interests). The EC has a decisive
role in legislature (e.g. EU budget legislation), but decisions taken by the EC generally need to ¯nd approval in the
Council of Ministers. At least to some extent, EU decision-making suggestively resembles negotiations between
member states which are pre-committed to national policies. The issue of policy commitment has received
attention in the discussion on the credibility of the Stability and Growth Pact which is intended to impose ¯scal
discipline on member states' public ¯nances, see von Hagen and Eichengreen (1996). Some European member
states repeatedly violated the negotiated ¯scal criteria possibly anticipating that the EC is not able to commit
to the enforcement procedure (prescribing ¯nes). In fact, these states have been successful in abandoning the
enforcement procedure.
7The underlying principle of a \social citizenship" is constitutionally anchored e.g. in Canada and Germany.
4capital taxes rise which inclines the federal government to rely less on distortionary labor taxes.
The net e®ect on total tax revenues turns out to be positive, which leaves public good provision
at a more e±cient level. The rationale is that local government do not only compete for mobile
capital, but also for federal transfers. The federal government allocates transfers dependent on
the inequality of public consumption across states. If a state collects more tax revenues relative
to the neighboring state (due to higher taxing e®ort), it forfeits transfers which undermines
taxing incentives. With capital mobility the neighboring state also collects more capital tax rev-
enues since capital moves to states which o®er a more attractive tax policy. If capital mobility
is su±ciently high, the neighboring state enjoys an increase in tax revenues which outweighs
the increase in the tax-raising state. In this situation federal transfers are re-shu²ed to the
tax-raising state - a positive transfer e®ect which counteracts the traditional tax competition
e®ect.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The related literature is reviewed in Section 2.
Section 3 introduces the model. The policy outcome in the case that both levels of government
decide simultaneously on policy instruments is presented in Section 4. Section 5 examines the
interaction between the federal and state level if the federal government pre-commits, while
Section 6 discusses the e±ciency implications if state governments pre-commit. Section 7 o®ers
some conclusions.
2 Related Literature
An analytical treatment of federal-local policy interaction is provided in Boadway and Keen
(1996), Boadway et al., (1998), Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002), and Boadway and Tremblay
(2006). In contrast to the ¯scal arrangement considered in this paper they assume an overlap-
5ping tax base.8 Additionally assuming a pre-commitment ability by the federal government9,
Boadway and Keen and Boadway et al. unravel the irrelevance of decentralized policy making
for resource allocation. With a tax base overlap the federal government replicates the unitary
state outcome by appropriately setting the federal taxes and distributing federally and locally
collected tax revenues across all levels of government (by means of federal transfers). If federal
transfers are missing, Keen and Kotsogiannis show that the federal government in general does
not replicate the unitary state policy outcome. The equilibrium may entail excessively high taxes
on the overlapping tax base. More related to this paper, Hoyt and Jensen (1996) adopt the same
tax assignment as we do. They ¯nd a positive welfare e®ect of a pre-commitment ability by
the federal government. The implications for the e±ciency of taxes and public expenditures are
however not elaborated upon.10
A Stackelberg leadership by lower level governments is equivalent to a common agency model.
States formally act as principals which face a common agent (the federal government). The com-
mon agency approach is initiated by Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and is subsequently applied
to issues of public ¯nance by e.g. Dixit (1996), Dixit et al. (1997), and Rama and Tabellini
(1998). In contrast to our contribution these papers address the interaction between private
agents and the government rather than between di®erent levels of government. Applying the
common agency approach to ¯scal federalism, Caplan et al. (2000) analyze local government's
incentives to contribute to a global public good. Therein, a pre-commitment by states enables
an e±cient local policy if the federal government provides transfers so as to equalize private con-
sumption across states.11 The current analysis di®ers from the contribution by adopting a ¯scal
8In some of the contributions rents are taxed at an exogenously given rate. Strategic intergovernmental
interaction takes place in the choice of taxes levied on the overlapping tax base.
9A frequently invoked alternative terminology is \timing of decisions". We subsequently use the terminology
\pre-commitment".
10Hoyt (2001) considers decision-making in a federation if the tax bases may only partially overlap. Di®erent
to this paper, neither level of government can pre-commit when selecting policy instruments (simultaneous policy
formation).
11Koethenbuerger (2004) also adopts a common agency approach to ¯scal federalism in which, similar to Caplan
6arrangement in which the public good is only locally consumed, the federal government is con-
cerned about the allocation of public consumption across states, and both levels of government
levy distortionary taxes.
The analysis also adds to the literature on soft budget constraints - see Kornai et al. (2003)
for a review.12 Formally elaborated by Dewatripont and Maskin (1995), a missing commitment
ability by the government lies at the root of the soft budget constraint phenomenon. Enterprises
form expectations that they will be bailed-out in case of insolvency which results in sub-optimal
investment choices. Wildasin (1997) shows that when applied to ¯scal federalism, bail-out ex-
pectations equally distort local policy. In order to qualify for a bail-out local government may
sub-optimally choose local expenditures.13 The current paper demonstrates that such strategic
local incentives may well improve the e±ciency of public good provision. The expectation of
qualifying for federal funds in response to local taxation serves as a countervailing incentive to
engage in a \race to the bottom" in tax competition.
3 The Model
We consider a model with 2 identical states. State i (i = 1;2) consists of a representative
household and a representative ¯rm. The former derives utility from a private good ci, leisure
`i, and a local public good gi. Preferences are
U(ci;`i;gi) = ci + h(`i) + b(gi);
et al. (2004) but in contrast to this paper, the federal government does not have access to a tax instrument. The
federal transfer scheme is required to be self-¯nancing.
12See Akai and Sato (2005) for a synthesis of the largely disconnected strands of literature on common agency
(alternatively referred to as decentralized leadership) and soft-budget constraints.
13Qian and Roland (1998) analyze how soft local budget constraints a®ect incentives to bail-out failing enter-
prises. In line with Wildasin (1997) they ¯nd local governments to spend less on local public consumption out
of own resources in an attempt to lure more transfers to their budget. Deducing the impact on overall welfare,
the disincentive e®ect needs to be weighted against the potential bene¯t of providing less (ex-ante) ine±cient
bail-outs.
7where h(¢) and b(¢) are strictly increasing and strictly concave. The time endowment is normal-
ized to unity which implies labor supply Li = 1 ¡ `i. Each household has a capital endowment
~ k. Utility is maximized subject to the budget constraint
ci = Ii + (wi ¡ ¿)Li + r~ k;
where Ii is income generated from a ¯xed factor (say land), wi is the wage rate in state i,
¿ denotes the labor income tax rate, and r is the interest rate. The labor supply decision is
characterized by the ¯rst-order condition14
wi ¡ ¿ ¡ h0(`i) = 0: (1)
The optimality condition implies that an increase in the net wage rate wi¡¿ leads to an increase
in labor supply.
Each state produces a single good with a constant returns to scale technology. Output can
be used either for private or public consumption on a one-to-one basis. For analytical simplicity
the technology is additively separable in labor li and capital ki. We should note that the results
developed in the paper are not speci¯c to the assumption. In a note (available upon request
and posted on the author's web-page) we outline the qualitative robustness of the results when
accounting for complementarity between labor and capital in production.
Invoking a linear production technology would generate the peculiar result that capital com-
pletely °ows to the region which o®ers the more favorable tax treatment. To preclude the
\buy-out" result, we introduce land as a productive factor (Kuhn and Wooton, 1987). The
production technology f(Bi;li;ki) satis¯es fi
j > and fi
jj < 0, j 2 fBi;li;kig, where Bi denotes
the amount of productive land in state i. Furthermore, fi
Bj < 0, j 2 fli;kig, and fi
lk = 0.
The representative ¯rm in each state maximizes pro¯ts ¼i = f(ki;li)¡wili ¡(r +ti)ki with
14Derivatives are indicated by
0. Subscripts of functions denote partial derivatives.
8ti as the source-based capital tax rate levied in state i.15 The pro¯t maximizing input choices
deduce from the familiar ¯rst-order conditions
fi
l = wi and fi
k = r + ti: (2)
The factor market equilibrium follows from Eqs. (1), (2), the capital market clearing condition
k1 + k2 = 2~ k, and the labor market clearing condition li = Li.16 The responses of li, ki, r and
































with ¢ := f1
kk + f2
kk < 0 and ¾ := ¡h00(`i) ¡ fi
ll > 0. The comparative static results re°ect
the interplay of the additive separability of preferences and of the assumption fi
lk = 0. They
insulate the labor (capital) market from capital (labor) taxation.
Incorporating optimal labor supply and factor demand choices and general equilibrium ef-
fects, we can write utility as a function of tax rates and public expenditures, V i(¿;ti;tj;gi).
Noting that output is exhausted by factor payments, i.e. ci = f(ki;li) ¡ fi
kki ¡ ¿li + r~ k, and
making use of Eqs. (1) - (4)
V i
¿ = ¡li; V i
ti = ¡ki(= ¡~ k) and V i
tj = 0; i 6= j; (5)
with symmetric capital tax rate choices. The result V i
tj = 0 re°ects the opposing e®ects a higher
tax rate in state j has on interest income and land income in state i. The income changes nullify
15For simplicity, the production factor land is omitted from notation in the subsequent analysis.
16The capital market clearing condition implies that capital is in ¯xed supply at the federal level. The assump-
tion is intended to re°ect the di®erential degree of capital mobility in a federation (being highest at the local
level) in an analytically tractable way. If capital were in elastic supply for the federation as a whole, the labor tax
would be set at a lower (same) level if f
i
lk > 0 (f
i
lk = 0) ceteris paribus; see Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991). The
level e®ect on labor taxes applies to all decision-making scenarios considered in the paper; thereby suggestively
not compromising the relative policy evaluation.
9each other with symmetrically chosen capital taxes. Straightforwardly, V i
g = b0(gi).
We consider a two-layer federal system: the federal level and the state level. State govern-
ments impose a source-based capital tax ftigi=1;2. The tax revenues are recycled by providing
a local public good fgigi=1;2. The federal government provides transfers fsigi=1;2 which are
¯nanced by a federally-uniform labor tax schedule ¿.17 The state and federal budget constraints
thus are







The federal transfer system features a gross equalization scheme (Boadway, 2004) in which
transfers have a dual role: they equalize public consumption across states and transfer federal
funds to lower-level governments in response to a vertical imbalance of tax revenues and expen-
ditures.18 Both levels of government are benevolent. State governments maximize the utility of
the representative household whereas the federal government chooses its policy instruments to




t1 = t2; ¿ = 0; and b0(gi) = 1: (7)
Uniform capital taxes ensure production e±ciency and a zero labor tax rate leaves the labor-
leisure choice undistorted. Since capital is in ¯xed supply to the federation, a uniform capital
tax is non-distortionary from society's perspective and revenues should only be raised through
capital taxation. The rate should be set so as to ¯nance the e±cient amount of local public
17Alternatively, fs
igi=1;2 can be interpreted as public services which are federally provided and which are perfect
substitutes for the locally provided service. In the sequel we adhere to the \transfer view". Transfers will more
likely be used for an interstate equalization of public funds and will thus exhibit the tax price e®ect characterized
in section 6.
18In contrast, a net equalization scheme only involves horizontal transfers (¿ ´ 0). Both types of equalization
schemes are of importance in real-world intergovernmental relations - even within one federation. For instance, in
Germany the municipal equalization system operates on a gross equalization basis while the equalization system
at the state level (LÄ ander¯nanzausgleich) is organized as a net equalization scheme.
10goods as characterized by the Samuelson condition b0(gi) = 1. As states are symmetric, we will
look at symmetric Nash equilibria which inherently feature production e±ciency.
4 Simultaneous Policy Choice
In this section, we characterize the policy outcome when both levels of government simultane-
ously decide on the policy instruments under their discretion (Nash-behavior). The decision
sequence of the game is:
First Stage: Both levels of government choose their policy instruments fti;si;¿gi=1;2 simulta-
neously, i.e. they take the policy instruments which is under the discretion of other governments
as given. They account for the e®ect of their decisions on the behavior of households and ¯rms.
Second Stage: Firms and households decide on fki;ligi=1;2 for given policy instruments
fti;si;¿gi=1;2.
The game is solved by backward induction to identify a symmetric subgame-perfect equilib-
rium.
State Government State government i's problem is to
max
ti V i(¿;ti;tj;tiki + si)
subject to ki = ki(ti;tj). The ¯rst-order condition for ti becomes:19
V i
ti + V i
g(tiki
ti + ki) = 0: (8)
Inserting (5) and rearranging yields:
b0(gi) =
1




19Although corner solutions may exist, we only report on interior solutions to all optimization problems analyzed
in the paper. Naturally, a corner solution does not exhibit strategic interaction in upper and lower level government
policy choices which is however the issue addressed in the paper.
11The state's marginal cost of public funds (r.h.s. of Eq. (9); henceforth SMCPF) is greater than
unity, as states perceive an out°ow of capital if they increase their capital tax rate for a given
tax rate of the other state. At an optimum the bene¯ts of taxation given by the marginal utility
of local public goods are equated to the marginal costs of taxation represented by the term 1
1+²i.
The state ¯rst-order condition (9), together with the state budget constraint (6), determines
the reaction functions fti = ti(si;¿)gi=1;2.












subject to fki = ki(ti;tj)gi=1;2 i6=j and fli = li(¿)gi=1;2. ¹ denotes the Lagrangian multiplier
associated with the federal budget constraint. The ¯rst-order conditions are
si : V i




¿ + ¹(¡li ¡ ¿li
¿) = 0: (10)
Making use of (5) and rearranging
b0(gi) =
1




The federal government sets transfers and the tax rate so as to equate the marginal rate of
substitution to the federal marginal cost of public funds (r.h.s. of Eq. (11); henceforth FM-
CPF). As labor taxes are distortionary (li
¿ < 0) the FMCPF exceed the social marginal rate of
transformation (= 1) which yields b0(gi) > 1. Note, federal transfer policy equalizes the SMCPF
and FMCPF; thereby aligning the tax base elasiticities ²i and ´i.
The federal ¯rst-order conditions (11) and the federal budget constraint (6) de¯ne the reac-
tion functions fsi = si(ti;tj);¿ = ¿(ti;tj)gi;j=1;2 i6=j.
12The underprovision equilibrium is related to the existence of a positive horizontal ¯scal
externality. Capital leaves state i in response to a rise in its capital tax rate which, in turn,
raises the tax base in the neighboring state - a positive e®ect external to state i's tax setting




each state would provide the e±cient amount
of public goods leaving no rationale for the federal government to ¯scally accommodate lower-
level government ¯nances (¿ = 0).
5 Sequential Policy Choice: Pre-Commitment by the Federal
Government
In this section, we analyze whether the ine±ciency of the public sector is attenuated when the
federal government has the capacity to pre-commit toward state governments (centralized lead-
ership). The sequence of decisions now becomes:
First Stage: The federal government chooses fsi;¿gi=1;2. It anticipates the reaction of the
state governments as well as the reaction of households and ¯rms.
Second Stage: State i decides on its policy variable ti taking the policy choice of the federal
government fsi;¿gi=1;2 and the neighboring state government tj as a given. It anticipates the
reaction of households and ¯rms.
Third Stage: For given policy variables fsi;ti;¿gi=1;2, households and ¯rms choose fki;ligi=1;2.
Again, the game is solved by backward induction in order to identify a symmetric subgame-
perfect equilibrium.
State Government The optimal policy choice of state i is ti = ti(si;¿). Inferring the slope
of the reaction function we di®erentiate the state ¯rst-order condition (9) and the state budget
















A change in the federal tax rate does not a®ect the choice of ti, i.e. state i's best-response
e®ectively is ti = ti(si). To sign state i's reaction to a marginal increase in transfers, note that,
by the second-order condition of the state's optimization problem, the denominator is positive.
This together with the assumption b00(gi) < 0 implies that state i's capital tax rate is decreasing
in the amount of transfers received.











subject to fki = ki(ti;tj)gi=1;2 i6=j, fli = li(¿)gi=1;2, and fti = ti(si)gi=1;2. The ¯rst-order
conditions are














¿ + ¹(¡li ¡ ¿li
¿)
¢
= 0; i 6= j; (13)
which have already been simpli¯ed using
¡
V i





si = 0 (by Eq. (8)). Imposing symmetry,






1 + ´i > 1; i 6= j: (14)
Unlike the case of Nash-behavior the federal government anticipates a reduction in ti when rais-




si. Since the federal government considers the substitution of own state tax revenues
by federal transfers (¯nanced by distortionary labor taxes ) as undesirable, the strategic e®ect
increases the marginal cost of labor taxation; yielding a lower labor tax (and thus transfers) and
by Eq. (12) a higher capital tax. Denoting (tc;¿c;sc) and (tN;¿N;sN) the optimal policy under
centralized leadership and Nash-behavior, respectively, we can state the following result:
14Proposition 1: Under centralized leadership the tax mix becomes more e±cient relative to
the Nash outcome, i.e. tc > tN and ¿c < ¿N.
At this point it might be informative to relate the result to the analysis in Boadway and
Keen (1996) and Boadway et al. (1998). In these contributions the federal government can
replicate the unitary nation optimum by pre-committing to its policy. Besides the assumption
of pre-commitment, the result is driven by a perfect tax base overlap.20 Setting a federal tax
rate, which, when summed up with the local tax, yields the overall level of taxation chosen in a
unitary state, the federal government can mitigate any ine±ciency in local tax policy.
With vertical tax base independency, the federal government is only indirectly able to con-
trol lower level governments' policy choices (via the state reaction function). The unitary state
outcome of a zero labor tax would eliminate labor supply distortions, but in the presence of
decentralized capital taxation would also expose the public expenditure level to a downward
pressure exerted by ¯scal competition among states. Weighting both e®ects the federal govern-
ment provides transfers (and therefore uses labor taxes) up to the point where the FMCPF,
adjusted for the adverse impact on state capital taxes, is equated to the SMCPF.
The implication for the level of public good provision is:
Proposition 2: Under centralized leadership local public good provision decreases relative to
the Nash level, i.e. gc < gN.
Proof: The proof involves a comparison of the SMCPF evaluated at (tN;¿N) and at (tc;¿c),
respectively. Based on the ¯rst-order condition (9) we then infer how public spending levels will
20The modelling choice implies that federal and local taxes are perfect substitutes in the private agents' decision
problem. This is substantially di®erent to our analysis where both taxes do not interact - see Eq. (12).













To verify the inequality note that the SMCPF is independent of ¿ since flk ´ 0 and thus ki
¿ ´ 0.













(tN;¿N). Following the ¯rst-order condition
b0(gi) = 1








By the strict concavity of b(gi), we can conclude that gi decreases relative to the Nash-level, i.e.
gc < gN. 2
Public consumption becomes more downward distorted in the centralized leadership game.
A lower amount of labor-tax ¯nanced transfers exposes public consumption levels more to states'
incentives to compete for mobile capital - with the familiar consequence of a downward distortion
in public consumption.
In equilibrium, the total amount of tax revenues decreases, but taxes are more e±ciently
collected. In spite of the e±ciency trade-o®, the welfare e®ect is ambiguous in sign. The federal
government is able to replicate the policy outcome under Nash-behavior by setting ¿c = ¿N.
Consequently, revealed by the policy preference of the federal government (¿c < ¿N), welfare
improves relative to welfare under Nash behavior.
6 Sequential Policy Choice: Pre-Commitment by State Govern-
ments
In this section, states governments have the ability to pre-commit toward the federal government
(decentralized leadership). The sequence of decisions becomes:
16First Stage: States simultaneously select the capital tax rate ftigi=1;2, i.e. each state takes
the tax rate of the other state government as a given. Both states take the reaction of the federal
government and private agents into account.
Second Stage: The federal level determines its policy variables fsi;¿gi=1;2 for given states'
policy choices ftigi=1;2. It anticipates the reaction of households and ¯rms.
Third Stage: Households and ¯rms determine fki;ligi=1;2 for given policy at the federal and
state level fsi;ti;¿gi=1;2.
The game is again solved by backward induction to identify a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Federal Government At stage 2 federal policy is characterized by the reaction functions
fsi = si(ti;tj);¿ = ¿(ti;tj)gi;j=1;2 i6=j. Di®erentiating the federal ¯rst-order condition (11) and








































Throughout the rest of the paper we invoke two assumptions:




1 + ´i > 0: (A)
21Appendix A.1 contains the derivation of the comparative static results.
17¯ ¯²i¯ ¯ < 1 states that state governments are on the upward-sloping part of their La®er-curve (with
respect to capital tax revenues).22 The second assumption relates to the monotonicity of the
FMCPF. A su±cient condition for the FMCPF to be strictly increasing in ¿ is that h0(`i) is
strictly convex and fi
l is strictly concave in li.23
Owing to the optimality of federal choices jAj is negative which, when combined with assump-
tion (A), signs ¿ti negative. In contrast, the transfer response is ambiguous in sign. Although
federal funds are formally unconditional, transfer are no longer perceived to be lump-sum. States
realize that transfers are set after states have chosen tax policy and, therefore, become implicitly
conditioned on their own capital tax rate choices. The way state governments expect tax policy
to in°uence the allocation of federal transfers depends on the sign of ®. If policy instruments are





ti + ki mea-





represents the corresponding cross tax-revenue e®ect. Illustratively, a positive ® (case (i) in
table 1) indicates a low capital reallocation due to a higher capital tax in state i. The increase
in tax revenues in state j is lower than the corresponding rise in state i's tax revenues. Thus,
b0(gj) > b0(gi). The federal government's concern for horizontal equalization (Eq. (10)) entails a
decreases in si which may go along with an increase in sj. A complete characterization of how
the comparative static analysis relates to ® is provided in Table 1.
State Government State government i solves:
max
ti V i(¿;ti;tj;tiki + si)




￿ < 1 is inherent to an equilibrium with
a positive capital tax rate - Eq. (9). Since transfers are now endogenous to state behavior, a state government
rationally takes the e®ect of its policy choice on both own tax revenue and transfers into account when selecting









1+´i > 0 is l
i
¿¿ < 0. Using Eq. (4), a su±cient condition for the latter
inequality to hold is h
000(`









Case (i): ® > 0 ¡ +¡ ¡
Case (ii): ® < 0 and ¯(tiki
ti + ki) > j®j ¡ ¡ ¡
Case (iii): ® < 0 and ¯(tiki
ti + ki) < j®j + ¡ ¡
Case (iv): ® < 0 and ¯(tiki
ti + ki) = j®j 0 ¡ ¡
Case (v): ® = 0 ¡ ¡ ¡
Table 1: Decentralized leadership: comparative static analysis.
subject to ki = ki(ti;tj), si = si(ti;tj) and ¿ = ¿(ti;tj). The ¯rst-order condition is
V i
ti + V i
¿¿ti + V i
g(tiki
ti + ki + si
ti) = 0: (21)
Besides the direct e®ects of state i's tax policy on its constituent's private and public consump-
tion, state i's taxing incentives are augmented by two strategic e®ects. State i also takes into
account how the induced change in the federal policy variables a®ects utility derived from pri-
vate consumption, V i




¿¿ti + V i
gsi
ti 6= 0, capital taxes in the decentralized leadership game di®er from capital taxes
chosen under a Nash conjecture. Denoting (td;¿d;sd) as the prevailing policy choices Proposi-
tion 3 relates the strategic e®ects to the sign of ®.
Proposition 3: If ® > (<) 0, the tax mix under decentralized leadership is less (more) ef-
¯cient relative to the tax mix under Nash behavior, i.e. td < (>) tN and ¿d > (<) ¿N. If
® = 0, the tax mix under decentralized leadership and Nash behavior is identical, i.e. td = tN
and ¿d = ¿N.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. The term ® is decisive in signing the tax di®erential
td ¡ tN which is inversely related to the tax di®erential ¿d ¡ ¿N. In a symmetric equilibrium
19Eq. (19) yields
signf®g = signftiki







where the last step follows from inserting ki
ti = ¡k
j
ti (Eq. (3)) and rearranging. The term ®
is positive (negative) provided the elasticity of the capital tax base j²ij is below (above) 0:5.
Proposition 3 implies that a low tax base elasticity leads to a less e±cient tax mix, while a suf-
¯ciently high elasticity leads to more e±cient taxing incentives under decentralized leadership.
The result is intriguingly related to the federal transfer response. Recall, a rise in public con-
sumption in state i following an increase in the capital tax rate induces an inequality in public
consumption in both states. To correct it, the federal government cuts back on transfers to the
tax raising state. With capital mobility the neighboring state equally enjoys an increase in the
tax base which counteracts the imbalance of public consumption. If the relocation of capital
(i.e. j²ij) is su±ciently high, state i may still forfeit transfers (case (ii) in table 1), but at a
relatively low level. With a moderate retrenchment of transfers, state i bene¯ts from a capital
tax higher than the Nash-level as more own-source tax revenues induce a reduced labor tax
burden. Increasing j²ij further, the cross-budget e®ect becomes strong enough such that state i
does not forfeit transfers (case (iv)) or even receives more federal funds (case (iii)). Now, the
transfer response weakly reinforces the impact of the federal tax response to tax mobile capital
at a higher rate.24
The implications for local public good provision are presented in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: If ® > (<) 0, local public good provision decreases (increases) relative to the
24It is instructive to analyze the interplay of the own and cross tax revenue e®ect in a federation with an
arbitrary number of symmetric states n ¸ 2. The in°uence of local tax policy on a single neighbor state's tax
revenues becomes smaller when n rises, and it is negligible in the limit n ! 1 (small open state). Since the
own tax revenue e®ect is positive, federal transfers are adjusted so as to distribute the additional tax revenues
equally across all states; an e®ect which leaves the tax-raising state with almost no taxing incentives. Hence, in
the limit n ! 1 the capital tax di®erential will satisfy t
d ¡ t
N < 0. More generally, the reasoning suggests that
the interval of elasticity values supporting t
d ¡ t
N > 0 is decreasing in n and is empty for n ! 1.
20Nash level of g, i.e. gd < (>) gN. If ® = 0, local public good provision is unaltered, i.e. gd = gN.
Proof: The proof involves a comparison of the FMCPF evaluated at (tN;¿N) and at (td;¿d),
respectively. Based on the ¯rst-order condition (11) we then infer how public spending levels
will adjust. Note ¯rst that labor supply, and thus the FMCPF, is independent of capital taxes if
symmetrically chosen. Precisely, symmetric capital tax rate changes in°uence the interest rate
which however has no e®ect on labor supply behavior - see (1). By (A) the FMCPF is positively












if ¿d T ¿N: (22)
Now, following the ¯rst-order condition b0(gi) = 1





(tN;¿N) if ¿d T ¿N:
By the strict concavity of b(gi), we can conclude that
gd S gN if ¿d T ¿N:
Relating the labor tax di®erential ¿d ¡ ¿N to ®, as stipulated by Proposition 3, completes the
proof. 2
In contrast to the ¯nding under centralized leadership a more e±cient tax structure translates
into a more e±cient provision of local public goods. Proposition 3 and 4 thus readily allows us
to infer the welfare di®erential (relative to simultaneous policy formation). When ® > (<) 0
e±ciency deteriorates (improves) over all decision margins which yields lower (higher) welfare.
The welfare result can be rationalized by the concept of ¯scal externalities. The total e®ect
of an incremental rise in ti on indirect utility V j is given by
dV j
dti = V j
¿ ¿ti + V j
g s
j
ti + V j
g tjk
j
ti; i 6= j: (23)
21The third term on the r.h.s. of Eq. (23) represents the positive horizontal ¯scal externality
responsible for an ine±ciently low taxation of capital in tax competition (Wildasin, 1989),
whereas the ¯rst two terms constitute the e®ect on neighbor's utility through the induced change
in the federal policy instruments ¿ and sj. Since the e®ects are mediated via the federal budget,
the e®ect may be termed a bottom-up-top-down vertical ¯scal externality.25 Invoking Eqs. (5),
(17) and (18) the vertical e®ects can be rewritten to
V j
¿ ¿ti + V j
g s
j




ti) + ®; i 6= j:
If ® > 0, the expression becomes positive.26 Thus, in addition to the positive horizontal ¯scal
externality a rise in the capital tax rate implies a positive vertical externality leading to an even
larger discrepancy between the social and private cost of taxation. Thus, td < tN. Conversely,
for ® < 0 the horizontal ¯scal externality is counteracted by a negative vertical externality which
yields td > tN. With ® = 0 the vertical externality vanishes and td = tN.27
The policy outcome is reminiscent of some well-known results in economics: the Rotten Kid
Theorem (Becker, 1981), the Samaritan Dilemma (Buchanan, 1975) and the Tragedy of the
Commons.
The Rotten Kid Theorem states that sel¯sh kids anticipate the altruistic parents' behavior.
The parents make transfers to the kids after having observed their actions. Thereby the sel¯sh
kids internalize spill-overs within the family and act in the interest of the parent. In the decen-
tralized leadership game considered here, the federal government is the parent and lower level
governments play the role of sel¯sh kids. When ® < 0 our result constitutes a weaker version
25The terminology is in analogy to the terminology suggested by Keen (1998) who classi¯es vertical budget
interdependencies into a bottom-up vertical externality (state policy a®ects the federal budget) and into a top-
down vertical externality (federal policy a®ects the state budget).




ti S 0. Furthermore, the federal government selects a labor tax rate at which the
federal tax revenue hill is up-ward sloping, i.e. l
j + ¿l
j
¿ > 0 - see Eq. (10).
27The vertical externality is an innate characteristic of the common agency framework adopted in this section.
Unlike in analyses of ¯scal federalism the literature on common agency refers to the horizontal externality as a
direct externality and the vertical one as an indirect externality (Martimore and Stole, 2003).
22of the theorem since the sel¯sh kids only partly act in the interest of the parent. The kids'
strategic incentives increase welfare, but do not yield e±ciency.
For ® > 0 the decentralized leadership game is related to the literature on the Samaritan
Dilemma. State governments strategically lower their own ¯scal e®ort anticipating the \altruis-
tic" preference of the federal government to provide transfers when locally collected tax revenues
decline. The inability of the federal government to commit not to help states out establishes a
Samaritan Dilemma in our framework.
Additionally, when ® > 0, the result resembles the Tragedy of the Commons here developed
in the context of ¯scal federalism. The federal budget constitutes a common pool resource which
is over-utilized by lower level governments. The tax di®erential ¿d¡¿N > 0 re°ects the incentive
to shift some of the burden of ¯nancing local expenditures to residents of the neighboring state
(via uniform labor taxation).28
It is also informative to compare the federal policy outcomes with the traditional tax com-
petition outcome (Zodrow and Mieszkowski, 1986); i.e. an equilibrium in which the federal gov-
ernment exogenously does not intervene (¿ ´ 0 and fsi ´ 0gi=1;2). Straightforwardly, invoking
a revealed preference argument, the federal government improves upon the traditional tax com-
petition outcome both with simultaneous decision-making and with a federal pre-commitment
capacity. A state pre-commitment capacity generates higher welfare than tax competition only
if the tax base elasticity is not too low. Concretely, if j²j = 0:5 welfare in the tax competi-
tion equilibrium is lower than in the equilibrium with a state pre-commitment. The reason is
that 0:5 is the threshold value pertaining to the welfare comparison with simultaneous decision-
making, which improves upon the tax competition outcome. The argument implies that the
28See also the literature on pork-barrel spending (Weingast et al., 1981). They assume that the cost of providing
local services is shared nationally by all taxpayers. Local governments over-provide public services which re°ects
the possibility to export some of the tax burden to non-residents. In deriving the result they do not resort to an
optimizing federal government.
23relevant elasticity threshold is below 0.5. However, the traditional tax competition outcome is
not welfare-inferior for all elasticity values below 0.5. Intuitively, for j²j ! 0 the ine±ciency
inherent to the tax competition equilibrium becomes small. In contrast, with decentralized
leadership the own tax-revenue e®ect tiki
ti + ki is large (as ki
ti < 0 is small), while the cross
tax-revenue e®ect tjk
j
ti becomes negligible (as k
j
ti = ¡ki
ti is small). A tax rate hike thus induces
a stark rise in state i's public funds, relative to the neighbor state. Due to the federal gov-
ernment's concern for horizontal equity the imbalance yields a severe loss of transfers in state
i. Consequently, state i's incentives to tax capital are weak when j²j ! 0, resulting in starker
e±ciency losses relative to tax competition with no federal intervention.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyzes how the pre-commitment ability of government entities a®ects the e±ciency
of resource allocation. The analysis demonstrates that if states are able to pre-commit, the
capital tax rate can be higher or lower relative to the capital tax rate chosen under the Nash-
conjecture. The prospect to receive more federal funds may increase capital taxes above the
level which prevails in tax competition. In contrast, capital taxes are unambiguously chosen at
a higher, but still ine±cient level if the federal level can pre-commit. On the expenditure side,
public good consumption choices exhibit a reinforced tendency to \race to the bottom" (relative
to simultaneous decision-making).
Contrasted with the traditional tax competition equilibrium, the paper shows that a federal
intervention robustly (i.e. irrespective of the governments' pre-commitment capacity) improves
welfare upon tax competition when incentives to compete for mobile capital are su±ciently
strong (high capital tax base elasticity).
The analysis does not resort to corrective grants to address the tax competition externality.
The design of corrective policy when state governments cannot pre-commit is well explored in
24existing literature - see e.g. Wildasin (1989).29 If state governments are however able to pre-
commit, a corrective grant will be neutral for state policy. Selecting ¯scal instruments after state
taxes are chosen leaves no rationale for the federal government to implement corrective policies.
As states correctly anticipate federal policy incentives, the policy outcome of the augmented
decentralized leadership game (including corrective grants) will coincide with the one delineated
above.30
The paper's results are of relevance for the design of tax coordination schemes which are
frequently recommended as a remedy to ine±cient tax competition among EU member states.
If member states have the capacity to pre-commit, capital tax choices are ine±cient similar to
the standard tax competition outcome. However, the rationale for tax coordination signi¯cantly
changes as it now also involves to redeem incentives to engage in transfer competition. Each
state's incentive to deviate from the agreed tax rate (or interval) is guided by how the capital
tax base (as typically considered) and federal transfers react to a downward deviation in capital
taxes.31 It is left to future research how these considerations jointly a®ect the design of a tax
coordination agreement which is voluntarily respected by e.g. EU member states.
A Appendix
A.1 Slope of the Reaction Functions
In this part of the appendix we derive the slopes of the reaction functions si = si(ti;tj), sj =
sj(ti;tj), and ¿ = ¿(ti;tj). Therefore, Eq. (11) (for both states) and the federal budget constraint
29We should note that introducing a federal corrective policy toward state governments would generically imply
an \undercorrection" of the tax competition externality since labor taxation is distortionary (e.g. Sandmo, 1975).
A ¯rst-best allocation would not be obtained.
30Di®erently, if the federal government is able to commit to corrective policy, but in particular not to equalizing
transfers, corrective grants are e®ective in changing state taxing incentives. See Koethenbuerger (2007) for a
motivation of a partial commitment capacity by the federal government. Therein it is shown that not only the
type of the equilibrium externality changes (compared with the traditional normative prescription), but also the
way how the corrective grant needs to re°ect the equilibrium externality.
31See Huizinga and Nielsen (2003) for an analysis of self-enforcing tax coordination agreements if only incentives
to compete for mobile tax bases are to be redeemed.



















































































































ti + ki) > 0: (25)
Given by the second-order conditions of the federal optimization problem jAj < 0. The sign of
jA3j is strictly positive since tjk
j
ti > 0 and by assumption (A) tiki
ti + ki > 0. Helpful in signing
jA1j and jA2j we rewrite both determinants as:
jA1j = ¯(tiki
ti + ki) + ® and jA2j = ¯(tjk
j



















26The sign of jA1j and jA2j depends on the sign and magnitude of ® and ¯ and is thus ambiguous.






















A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 3 is proved by establishing two lemmata. Lemma 1 states conditions for td to be
greater, equal, or lower than tN. Lemma 2 presents a re¯ned condition pertaining to cases (i),
(ii), and (v) listed in table 1.
Lemma 1: If si
ti ¸ 0 the capital tax rate under decentralized leadership exceeds the capital
tax rate under both-sided Nash behavior, i.e. td > tN. If si

























Proof: The optimal state behavior is characterized by Eq. (21). Thus, starting from the
Nash outcome tN, as characterized by Eq. (9), state i's incentive to deviate from tN depends on
the terms V i
gsi
ti and V i
¿¿ti. By Eq. (5) V i





ti is non-negative (case (iii) and (iv)), state i can increase after-tax
labor income as well as local public good provision by setting td > tN. To prove the second
assertion, consider the opposite case. If si
ti < 0 and ¡li¿ti > (<)
¯ ¯b0(gi)si
ti
¯ ¯, state i can improve
utility of the representative household by choosing td > (<) tN. For the special case si




¯ ¯ the opposite e®ects nullify each other and td = tN. 2
27For case (iii) and (iv) ¿ti < 0 and si
ti ¸ 0. Thus, Lemma 1 predicts td > tN. In case (iv),
¿ti < 0 and si
ti = 0 and consequently td > tN. In case (i), (ii), and (v), the transfer and labor
tax response are opposite in sign. Lemma 2 provides a condition which allows us to sign the
net-e®ect in these three cases.




















































ti + ki) + ®
¯ ¯: (29)
Using the fact that in equilibrium b0(gi) = 1









ti + ki) + ®
¯ ¯ (30)
with ¯ > 0 as given by Eq. (20). Since in case (i), (ii), and (v), ¯(tiki
ti +ki)+® > 0, inequality





ti + ki ¡ tjk
j
ti) + ®:







28and to the corresponding tax rates given by condition (27) in Lemma 1. 2
In case (i), tiki
ti + ki > tjk
j
ti, which gives ® > 0. Consequently, implied by Lemma 2 state
i chooses td < tN. The decrease in si, following a marginal increase in ti, dominates the positive
e®ect of a lower labor tax rate. In case (ii), tiki
ti+ki < tjk
j
ti and, thus, ® < 0. Lemma 2 predicts
a tax rate choice td > tN. In case (v), tiki
ti +ki = tjk
j
ti and, thus, ® = 0. Consequently, td = tN.
To infer how the federal government sets labor taxes and transfers in a symmetric equilibrium,
we evaluate how the FMCPF and the marginal bene¯t of transfer spending have changed due
to an adjustment in capital taxes (relative to the Nash outcome). First observe that at a
symmetric allocation the FMCPF is independent of the level of td, ceteris paribus. The reason
is that in any symmetric equilibrium capital employment is ki = ~ k which yields an identical
labor demand across regimes. Also, for a given ¿, labor supply is unchanged - see (1). Thus,
equilibrium employment behavior is independent of the level of capital taxes once symmetrically
chosen. Furthermore, given s = sN, b0(g) T b0(gN) if td S tN. Following the federal ¯rst-order
condition (11) and assumption (A), the federal government will choose ¿d T ¿N if td S tN.
Since the federal government operates on the upward-sloping part of the federal tax revenue
curve (0 > ´i > ¡1 - see (11)), sd T sN if and only if ¿d T ¿N which completes the proof of
Proposition 3.
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